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Abstract
Most empirical models of dynamic games assume the discount factor to be known and focus
on the estimation of the payo¤ parameters. However, the discount factor can be identied when
the payo¤s satisfy parametric or other nonparametric restrictions. We show when the payo¤s
take the popular linear-in-parameter specication, the joint identication of the discount factor
and payo¤ parameters can be simplied to a one-dimensional model that is easy to analyze.
We also show that switching costs (e.g. entry costs) that often feature in empirical work can
be identied in closed-form, independently of the discount factor and other specication of the
payo¤ function. Our identication strategies are constructive. They lead to easy to compute
estimands that are global solutions. Estimating the discount factor permits direct inference on
borrowing rate. Our estimates of the switching costs can be used for specication testing. We
illustrate with a Monte Carlo study and the dataset from Ryan (2012).
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1 Introduction
A structural study involves modeling the economic problem of interest based on some primitives
that govern an economic model. The primitives have a clear interpretation. The empirical goal
is to estimate them, which can then be used for counterfactual analysis. Our paper studies some
identication and estimation aspects for a stationary dynamic discrete game that generalizes the
single agent Markov decision problem surveyed in Rust (1994). The primitives of the games we
consider consist of players (per-period) payo¤ functions, discount factor, and Markov transition law
of the variables in the model.
There is anecdotal evidence from the literature on single agent models that implies that dynamic
games are generally not identied nonparametrically. For example, Manski (1993) shows that the
discount factor cannot be identied jointly with the payo¤ function that is nonparametric; Magnac
and Thesmar (2002) show the payo¤ function cannot be identied even if all other primitives of the
model are known; Norets and Tang (2014) show the payo¤ function can only be partially identied
when the distributions of unobservable state variables are unknown with discrete observable states.
But identication is possible with more structure on the model. For examples, see Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong and Nekipelov (2009), Blevins (2014), Chen
(2014), as well as Fang and Wang (2014). Hence, in spite of the under-identied nature of a general
structural dynamic model, many fruitful empirical research can be, and has been, conducted based
on these dynamic models using the theoretical results as guide.
Empirical applications of dynamic games often focus on the estimation of the parametric pay-
o¤ functions and seemingly always assume the value of the discount factor to be known. An in-
discriminating list of examples include: Beresteanu, Ellickson and Misra (2010), Collard-Wexler
(2013), Dunne, Klimek, Roberts and Xu (2013), Gowrisankaran, Lucarelli, Schmidt-Dengler and
Town (2010), Igami (2015), Lin (2012), Sanches, Silva Junior and Srisuma (2014), Snider (2009) and
Suzuki (2013). There appears to be no formal justication as to why the discount factor has to be
presumed known rather than estimated. Commonly cited reasons, if any is given at all, include prece-
dence from the single agent literature, lack of identication, numerical di¢culties (e.g. intractability
or convergence failure) and post-estimation issues (e.g. implausible or imprecise estimates). The
underlying sources for the rst reasoning can also be traced to the other closely related, but distinct,
issues.1,2
1Some noted estimation attempts in the single agent context include: Rust (1987, pp. 1023), who says I was not
able to precisely estimate the discount factor, while Slade (1998, pp. 102) also xes the discount factor after it was
found that the objective function is fairly at over some range.
2Estimation of the discount factor in some related nite-time horizon models is more standard, and with more
encouraging ndings. E.g. see Keane and Wolpin (1997). But negative or other implausible estimates have also been
2
Identication is a property of the model. It is customary to translate the behavioral condition
that denes (parametric, point-) identication into a loss function with a unique minimum for the
purpose of estimation. There are often many candidates of loss functions. A positive identication
for one is su¢cient to identify the model. However, in general, verifying that a nonlinear function of
several variables has a unique minimum point is a di¢cult mathematical task. The degree of di¢culty
can depend crucially on the choice of the loss function. This also relates directly to the practical
aspects of computing the estimand.3 Particularly it may not even be a trivial assumption to assume
that one can always nd the global minimum of a nonlinear loss function with many parameters in
a dynamic game due to intractable components of the model. Therefore, in practice, implausible
estimates may also arise due to a purely a numerical reason even if the model is correctly specied.4
Our paper aims to show that it is not necessary to assume the discount factor a priori in order to
analyze empirical games. We consider two important special cases. First, we show that when payo¤s
take a linear parameterization, joint identication of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters can
be analyzed as a one-parameter model irrespective of the number of payo¤ parameters. Second,
for games with switching costs (such as entry costs and scrap values), we show the switching cost
parameters can be identied in closed-form independently of the discount factor and specication of
other parts of the payo¤ function. Our identication strategies are constructive. The corresponding
estimands are easy to compute. An important feature is they aim to obtain global solutions to
potentially complex optimization problems in a transparent manner. Then the estimates of the
discount factor permit testing of borrowing costs and other dynamic considerations directly. Also
the closed-form estimators for the switching costs can be used for specication testing. E.g. testing
the mode of competition amongst rms, by comparing them with estimates from existing methods
that explicitly specify the entire payo¤ function.
The non-identication argument in Manski (1993) does not preclude us from studying the identi-
cation of the discount factor since the payo¤ functions employed in practice satisfy a priori specied
parametric and/or other nonparametric restrictions. However, even in a single agent model with a
known discount factor, establishing that the parametric payo¤ parameters are identied is di¢cult
due to the nonlinear nature of the model that contains an intractable value function. Furthermore in
dynamic games there may be multiple equilibria, subsequently the model may be incomplete (Tamer
(2003)). We proceed in the same way as Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari et
reported (e.g. see Hotz and Miller (1993)).
3For example, as Hotz, Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994) noted in their footnote 13 on pp. 280 that: There is
nothing inherent in our method which precludes estimation of  [the discount factor] ... our primary reason for not
estimating  was the intractability it presented for implementing the ML [a competing] estimator.
4Since a structural model is interpreted as an approximation of the data generating process, misspecication here
means that the data is not tted well by the model with economically plausible parameter values.
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al. (2009) and study identication using the implied expected discounted payo¤s that generates
the data based on the observed transition probabilities. More specically we take the model to be
the collection of implied expected discounted payo¤s as a mapping from the parameter space. Such
model reduces the degree of intractability of the model and circumvents the issue of incomplete-
ness, and is the basis for all what is known as two-step estimation methods in the literature (e.g.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007),
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)).
We rst consider the linear-in-parameter payo¤ specication due to its overwhelmingly com-
mon usage in empirical work; examples include those in the list of applications above.5 When the
discount factor is known, the corresponding implied expected discounted payo¤ also takes the linear-
in-parameter structure. Various computational exploits of this linear structure have been noted,
e.g. see Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994), Bajari, Benkard, Levin (2007), Bajari et al. (2009), and
Sanches, Silva Junior and Srisuma (2016). In particular Sanches et al. (2016) translate the identi-
cation condition for the linear payo¤ parameter in terms of the uniqueness of the minimum Euclidean
norm between the observed and model implied expected discounted values. Their estimator has the
familiar closed-form OLS expression and condition for identication can be given in terms of the full
rank condition of a matrix. See Assumption B1 in Sanches et al. (2016). It is worth emphasizing
that their Assumption B1 is also necessary for consistent estimation of any two-step estimator in
that setting.
When the discount factor is unknown and taken as part of the parameter space the model becomes
intrinsically nonlinear. Existing conditions that ensure identication in a nonlinear parametric model
in econometrics can be hard to verify and the scope of applications is limited by stringent conditions;
see Komunjer (2012) for recent results. Here we show that the identication for games with linear-
in-parameter payo¤s can be analyzed exhaustively even when the parameter space is large. We
follow the approach in Sanches et al. (2016) and expand the parameter space to include the discount
factor. The least squares framework enables us to simplify the problem by just considering a one-
dimensional path of the parameter space. In particular, for any value of the discount factor, there
exists a vector of payo¤ parameters that minimize the least squares that has a closed-form OLS
expression. The proled distance becomes a mapping from [0; 1] to R. Therefore an exhaustive
analysis of identication for the discount factor reduces to simply evaluating a function with one
argument over a small domain. Once the identication of the discount factor is established it can be
taken as known. The payo¤ parameters is then identied if an analogous condition to Assumption
5Other specications that have been employed are often motivated by the need to impose additional constraints.
E.g. Fan and Xiao (2014) use a linear index in an exponential function to ensure non-negativity of their variable
prots.
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B1 in Sanches et al. (2016) holds.
When the parameterization of the payo¤ function is not linear we focus on reducing the parameter
space instead of studying the joint identication of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters. Our
approach reects a common practice that not all components of the payo¤ function need to be treated
in the same way. Parts of the payo¤ function, such as variable prots, can be estimated directly
using economic theory if relevant data are available. These serve as exclusion restrictions (e.g. see
Berry and Haile (2010, 2012)). The remaining components are dynamic parameters of the game that
have to be estimated using the structure of the dynamic models. One of the most prevalent type of
dynamic parameters arises from players choosing di¤erent actions from the previous period. Specic
examples include entry cost and scrap value in games with entry, menu costs in pricing problems,
as well as adjustment costs in investment decisions. We refer to these as switching costs. Switching
costs, by denition, have built-in nonparametric structures that impose how they can appear in the
payo¤ function.
We show that switching costs can be identied, in a closed-form, independently of the discount
factor and specication of the remaining components of the payo¤ function. It may not come as a
surprise that such result requires some restrictions on the payo¤s as well as the dependence structure
of the controlled Markov process. However, the conditions we impose can be motivated empirically
and have been frequently assumed in the empirical literature. Specically, we assume that, whether
a player may incur a switching cost in each period is only determined by her own action. The
state variables, such as past actions of all players, can otherwise a¤ect todays switching costs in
an arbitrary way. We also require that the remaining components of the payo¤ function do not
depend on past actions (this can be relaxed to allow dependence of a nite time lag). The latter
condition is satised by typical payo¤ components. E.g. variable prots that are determined by the
competition between players depend only on those present in the game (for instance a Cournot or
an auction game), as well as xed operating costs. We also limit the feedback of past actions in the
Markov process. We assume that the past actions do not a¤ect the transition law of future states
conditional on todays actions and states. Our conditional independence requirement is a testable
assumption, and is weaker than the frequently assumed condition that state variables other than
actions are strictly exogenous. Examples of empirical models that satisfy these assumptions can be
found in the applications cited above amongst many others.
The classic combination of exclusion and independence restrictions is a powerful tool for estab-
lishing nonparametric identication in structural models; see Matzkin (2007, 2012). Examples of
related models can be found in Blevins (2014) and Chen (2014), who use di¤erent exclusion and
independence assumptions to identify the distribution of the unobserved state variables in a single
agent setting. In our case, the proposed framework enables us to set up a linear system containing
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switching costs and some nuisance parameters that depend on all primitives of the game. In a single
agent dynamic decision model, the switching costs can then be identied by simply di¤erencing out
the nuisance parameters. For a dynamic game, the nuisance terms can be eliminated by a projection
that can be interpreted as a generalized di¤erence. Therefore the switching costs can be identied up
to some location normalizations that accounts for the nonparametric specication of the remaining
components of the payo¤ function. Our approach to eliminate the nuisance term therefore shares
some similarities with the pair-wise di¤erencing approach that is useful for the estimation of com-
plicated nonlinear models (e.g. see Honoré and Powell (2005)). Notably, the pair-wise di¤erence
estimator that Hong and Shum (2010) propose for a single agent dynamic investment model can also
be computed without the knowledge of the discount factor.6
The estimation of dyamic games is generally considered to be a numerically challenging task.
Analogous to the identication argument above, the choice of the estimation methodology can be
crucial for practical analysis of dynamic games. Traditional approach in econometrics takes consistent
estimation for granted and focuses on e¢ciency. However, even consistency of a sensible looking
estimation procedure may be problematic in practice due to the complicated nature of dynamic
games. E.g. see Appendix A in Srisuma (2013), and also a series of papers related to sequential
estimation methods (Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2010), Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) and
Egesdal, Lai and Su (2015)). In this paper we focus on the simplicity of implementation. We adopt
the approach of Sanches et al. (2016). The contribution of that paper highlights the computational
advantages that least squares criterions in expected payo¤s have over its dual representation in terms
of the choice probabilities; particularly as proposed by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).7
Importantly they show the estimators are in fact asymptotically equivalent but the numerical e¤orts
in computing the latter can be substantially higher.8 It can be shown that these advantages are
conserved when the parameter space expands to include the discount factor.
Our estimators can then be constructed according to our identication arguments. Our proling
estimator uses the closed-form OLS expression for the linear payo¤ parameters in terms of the
6The motivation behind Hong and Shum (2010)s estimator is actually to avoid the computation of the value
function rather than constructing a robust estimator. In particular they di¤erence out the future discounted payo¤s
between two economic agents if their investment accumulations are (nearly) equal under a deterministic state transition
rule.
7There are also other authors have also proposed estimators that minimize expected payo¤s. In particular, under
the linear-in-parameter assumption, the estimators of Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994) and Bajari et al. (2009) take
and an IV form.
8The class of estimators proposed by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) has been well received. It includes
the non-iterative estimator of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and the moment estimator of Pakes, Ostrovsky and
Berry (2008) as special cases.
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discount factor. Therefore our joint estimation of the discount factor and the payo¤ parameters can
be conducted by a simple and exhaustive one-dimensional search over the support of the discount
factor. In games with switching costs, closed-form estimation of switching costs serves to reduce
the number of parameters to be estimated. The dimensionality reduction can be substantial in a
game with large dimensions; as the number of unrestricted switching costs for each player grow at a
quadratic rate with respect to the number of possible actions, which then grows exponentially fast
with the number of players for every state.
We provide a Monte Carlo study to analyze some basic statistical properties of our proposed
estimators. We then use the dataset from Ryan (2012) to estimate a dynamic game played between
rms in the US Portland cement industry. In our version of the game, rms choose whether to enter
the market as well as decide on the capacity level of operation (ve di¤erent levels). We assume rms
compete in a capacity constrained Cournot game, so the period prot can be estimated directly from
the data as done in Ryan. The remaining part of the payo¤ consists of xed operating costs and 25
switching cost parameters. Other dynamic parameters we estimate include the discount factor and
xed operating cost. We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before 1990, and once
after 1990, which coincides with the date of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA). Our
switching costs estimates generally appear sensible, having correct signs and relative magnitudes.
They show that rms entering the market with a higher capacity level incur larger costs, and suggest
that increasing capacity level is generally costly while a reduction can return some revenue. We also
nd that operating and entry costs are generally higher after the 1990 CAAA, which supports Ryans
key nding. We are also able to estimate the discount factor with reasonable precision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the theoretical model and
states the modeling assumptions. Section 3 considers the joint identication of discount factor and
payo¤ parameters under the linear specication. Section 4 shows the closed-form identication of
switching costs. Section 5 illustrates the use of our estimator with simulated and real data. Section
6 concludes.
2 Model and Assumptions
We consider a game with I players, indexed by i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig, who compete over an innite time
horizon. The variables of the game in each period are action and state variables. The action set of each
player is A = f0; 1; : : : ; Kg. Let at = (a1t; : : : ; aIt) 2 A
I . We will also occasionally abuse the notation
and write at = (ait; a it) where a it = (a1t; : : : ; ai 1t; ai+1t : : : ; aIt) 2 A
I . Player is information set is
represented by the state variables sit 2 S, where sit = (xt; "it) such that xt 2 X, for some compact
set X  RdX . State xt is public information, which is common knowledge to all players and observed
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by the econometrician, while "it = ("it (0) ; : : : ; "it (K)) 2 R
K+1 is private information only observed
by player i. We dene st  (xt; "t) and "t  ("1t; : : : ; "It). Future states are uncertain. Players
actions and states today a¤ect future states. The evolution of the states is summarized by a Markov
transition law P (st+1jst; at). Each player has a payo¤ function, ui : A
I  S ! R, which is time
separable. Future periods payo¤s are discounted at the rate  2 [0; 1).
The setup described above, and the following assumptions, which we shall assume throughout the
paper, are standard in the modeling of dynamic discrete games. For examples, see Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
Assumption M1 (Additive Separability): For all i; ai; a i; x; "i:
ui (ai; a i; x; "i) = i (ai; a i; x) +
X
a0i2A
"i (a
0
i)  1 [ai = a
0
i] .
Assumption M2 (Conditional Independence I): The transition distribution of the states
has the following factorization for all x0; w"0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; a) = Q ("0)G (x0jx; a) ;
where Q is the cumulative distribution function of "t and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at.
Assumption M3 (Independent Private Values): The private information is independently
distributed across players, and each is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure
whose density is bounded on RK+1 with unbounded support.
Assumption M4 (Discrete Public Values): The support of xt is nite so that X =
x1; : : : ; xJ
	
for some J <1.
The game proceeds as follows. At time t, each player observes sit and then chooses ait simulta-
neously. Action and state variables at time t a¤ects sit+1. Upon observing their new states, players
choose their actions again and so on. We consider a Markovian framework where players behavior
is stationary across time and players are assumed to play pure strategies. More specically, for some
i : S ! A, ait = i (sit) for all i; t, so that whenever sit = si then i (sit) = i (si ) for any  .
Beliefs are also time invariant. Player i0s beliefs, i, is a distribution of at = (1 (s1t) ; : : : ; I (sIt))
8
conditional on xt for some pure Markov strategy prole (1; : : : ; I). The decision problem for each
player is to solve, for any si,
max
ai2f0;1g
fE[ui (ait; a it; si) jsit = si; ait = ai] + E [Vi (sit+1) jsit = si; ait = ai]g; (1)
where Vi (si) =
1X
=0
E [ui (ait+ ; a it+ ; sit+ ) jsit = si] :
The expectation operators in the display above integrate out variables with respect to the probability
distribution induced by the equilibrium beliefs and Markov transition law. Vi denotes the value
function. Note that the beliefs and primitives completely determine the transition law for future
states. Any strategy prole that solves the decision problems for all i and is consistent with the beliefs
satises is an equilibrium strategy. Pure strategies Markov perfect equilibria have been shown to
exist for such games (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)).
We consider identication based on the joint distribution of the observables, namely (at; xt; xt+1),
which is consistent with a single equilibrium play. The ideal data set is therefore a long time series
from a single market. Although more commonly, datasets used in empirical work have short panel
from multiple markets, the joint distribution of the observables can still be identied if they are
generated from the same equilibrium.9 The primitives of the game under this setting consists of
(fig
I
i=1 ; ;Q;G). Throughout the paper we shall also assume G and Q to be known (the former
can be identied from the data).
3 Identication with Linear-in-Parameter Payo¤s
In this section we consider games where payo¤s have a linear-in-parameter specication. Section 3.1
denes identication for the parameter of interest and provide some representation lemmas based on
the linear payo¤ structure. Section 3.2 studies identication by proling.
3.1 Denition of Identication and Some Representation Lemmas
We assume the following assumption holds throughout this section.
Assumption M5 (Linear-in-Parameter): For all i; ai; a i; x:
i (ai; a i; x; ) = i0 (ai; a i; x) + 
>i1 (ai; a i; x) ,
where i0 is a known real value function, i1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and 
belongs to Rp.
9Otsu, Pesendorfer and Takahashi (2015) have recently proposed a test for the poolability of data across markets.
9
The role of i0 is to represent the payo¤ components that are identiable without the knowledge
of the discount factor. In practice i0 and possibly parts of i1 may have to be estimated (e.g. see
Section 5.2). For the purpose of identication they can be treated as known.
The primitives of interest belong to B  , where B = [0; 1) and  = Rp for some non-negative
integer p. We are interested in the data generating discount factor and payo¤ parameters, which we
denote by 0 and 0 respectively. We rst dene the choice specic expected payo¤s for choosing
action ai prior to adding the period unobserved state variable, which is computed for di¤erent  and
, for any i; ai and x:
vi (ai; x; ; ) = E [i (ai; a it; xt; ) jxt = x] + gi (ai; x; ; ) ; (2)
where gi (ai; x; ; )  E [Vi (sit+1; ; ) jait = ai; xt = x] with Vi (si; ; ) 
P1
=0 
E [ui (at+ ; sit+ ; ) jsit = s
and ui (at; sit; )  i (at; xt; )+
P
a0i2A
"it (a
0
i) 1 [ait = a
0
i]. Note that the expectations here are taken
with respect to the observed choice and transition probabilities that are consistent with 0 and 0.
We consider the relative payo¤s in (2) with action 0 as the base, so that for all i; ai > 0 and x:
vi (ai; x; ; ) = E [i (ai; a it; x; ) jxt = x] + gi (ai; x; ; ) ; (3)
wherevi (ai; x; ; )  vi (ai; x; ; ) vi (0; x; ; ) ;i (ai; a i; x; )  i (ai; a i; x; ) i (0; a i; x; )
for all ai, and gi (ai; x; ; )  gi (ai; x; ; )   gi (0; x; ; ). Using Hotz-Millers inversion, it
follows that vi (ai; x; 0; 0) is identied from the data for all i; ai; x. We take each pair (; )
to be a structure of the (empirical) model and its implied expected payo¤s, denoted by V; 
fvi (ai; x; ; )gi;ai;x2IAX , to be its corresponding reduced form.
10,11 We can then dene identi-
cation using the notion of observational equivalence in terms of the expected payo¤s.
Definition I1 (Observational Equivalence): Any distinct (; ) and (0; 0) in B  are
observationally equivalent if and only if V; = V0;0 .
Definition I2 (Identification): An element in B  , say (; ), is identied if and only if
(0; 0) and (; ) are not observationally equivalent for all (0; 0) 6= (; ) in B .
The following lemma relates the parameters we want to identify to what can be observed.
10The empirical model is a pseudo-model. Because we do not use the equilibrium probabilities of the dynamic game
corresponding to ; . We only consider the implied expected payo¤s computed using the equilibrium beliefs that
generate the data.
11It is equivalent to dene the reduced forms in terms of expected payo¤s is equivalent to dening them in terms of
conditional choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993), Matzkin (1991), Norets and Takahashi (2013)).
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Lemma 1: Under M1 - M5, we have for all i; ai > 0, vi (ai; x; ; ) can collected in the following
vector form for all (; ) 2 B :
vaii (; ) = R
ai
i0 + H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri0 (4)
+
 
Raii1 + H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1


+Haii (IJ   L)
 1
i;
where the elements in the equation above are collected and explained in Tables 1 and 2.
Matrix Dimension Representing
Raii1 J by p E [i1 (a it) jxt = ; ait = ai]  E [i1 (a it) jxt = ; ait = 0]
Ri1 J by p E [i1 (a it) jxt = ]
L J by J E[ (xt+1) jxt = ]
Hi J by J E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = ai]  E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = 0]
Table A. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter
represent conditional expectations for any function  of xt+1.
Vector Representing
i E
hP
a0i2A
"it (a
0
i)  1 [ait = a
0
i]
 xt = i
Raii0 E [i0 (ait; a it; xt) jxt = ; ait = ai]  E [i0 (ait; a it; xt) jxt = ; ait = 0]
Ri0 E [i0 (at; xt) jxt = ]
(IJ   L)
 1
Rij
P1
=0 
E[ij (at+ ; xt+ ) jxt = ]
Haii (IJ   L)
 1
Rij
P1
=1 
E[ij (at+ ; xt+ ) jxt = ; ait = ai]
 
P1
=1 
E[ij (at+ ; xt+ ) jxt = ; ait = 0]
Haii (IJ   L)
 1
i
P1
=1 
E
hP
a0i2A
"it+ (a
0
i)  1 [ait+ = a
0
i]
 xt = ; ait = aii
 
P1
=1 
E
hP
a0i2A
"it+ (a
0
i)  1 [ait+ = a
0
i]
 xt = ; ait = 0i
Table B. The J by 1 vectors represent (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s.
Proof: This is a slight variation of Lemma R in Sanches et al. (2016).
Lemma 1 is simply a vectorization (across states) of the di¤erences in discounted expected payo¤s
for player i from choosing action ai relative to action 0. From the data we can identify v
ai
i (0; 0)
for all i; ai > 0. Hence, to identify (0; 0), it is enough to show that for all (; ) 6= (0; 0),
vaii (; ) 6= v
ai
i (0; 0) for some i and ai. Our next lemma provides a characterization as to how
changing  and  can a¤ect the expected payo¤s.
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Lemma 2: Under M1 - M5, for any i; ai > 0 and (; ) ; (
0; 0) 2 B :
vai (; ) v
a
i (; 
0) =
 
Raii1 + H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1

(   0) ; (5)
vai (
0; 0) vai (; 
0) = (   0)Haii (IJ   
0L)
 1
(IJ   L)
 1 (Ri0 +Ri1
0 + i) : (6)
And (; ) is identiable if and only if there is no other (0; 0) such that for all i; ai > 0:
vai (
0; 0) vai (; 
0) = vai (; ) v
a
i (; 
0) :
Proof: Follows from some algebra based on equation (4).
Lemma 2 illustrates the nature of the identication problem we have at hand. We highlight the
following particulars:
(i) If the discount rate is assumed to be known, from (5), a su¢cient condition for vai (0; ) 6=
vai (0; 
0) when  6= 0 is that Raii1 + H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1 has full column rank for some
i; ai > 0.
(ii) If the payo¤ function is assumed to be known, from (6), a su¢cient condition forvai (
0; 0) 6=
vai (; 0) when  6= 
0 is that (Ri0 +Ri1
0 + i) 6= 0 and H
ai
i is invertible some i; ai > 0.
(iii) Suppose p is large relative to J . Then for any i; ai > 0 such thatR
ai
i1+H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1
has rank J , and for any 0;  6= 0 that vai (
0; 0) 6= vai (; 
0), by equating (5) and (6), we can
always nd  such that vai (
0; 0) = vai (; ).
Point (i) shows that su¢cient conditions for identication of the payo¤ parameters when the
discount rate is assumed known can be easily stated and veried. More generally the su¢cient
condition for the identication of the payo¤ parameter can be stated in terms of the full column rank
of the matrix that stacks together Raii1 + H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1 over all i and ai. In the case we
can identify the payo¤ function directly from the data, (ii) shows that the discount factor can also
be identied and provide one type of su¢cient conditions that can be readily checked. Point (iii)
shares the intuition along the line of Manski (1993) that when the parameterization on the payo¤
function is too rich, (; ) may not identiable in B .
From Lemma 2, it is also apparent that we should be able to identify (0; 0) jointly when the
change in the vector of expected payo¤s from altering the discount factor moves in a di¤erent direction
to the change caused by altering the payo¤ parameters.
3.2 Proling
Proling makes use of the fact that for each  the expected payo¤s are linear in . We dene
maii (; )  v
ai
i (0; 0) v
ai
i (; ), so that we can write:
maii (; ) = a
ai
i () B
ai
i () ;
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where from (4),
aaii () = v
ai
i (0; 0) R
ai
i0   H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1 (Ri0 + i) ;
Baii () = R
ai
i1 + H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1:
It is clear that for any given , maii (; ) is linear in . The system of equations above can be
expanded by stacking them across all i and ai. In doing so we obtain the following vector value
function, m : B ! RIJK :
m (; ) = a () B () ;
where a () is a IJK by 1 vector and B () is a IJK by p matrix. LetM (; )  km (; )k, i.e.
the Euclidean norm of m (; ). Then by construction,
M (; ) = 0 if (; ) = (0; 0) ;
and any other (; ) such thatM (; ) = 0 is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) by the property
of the norm. Next we prole out . Let y denotes the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of a matrix.
For each , we dene:
 () =

B ()>B ()
y
B ()> a () ;
so that  () is a least squares solution to min2M (; ). Then we dene:
M () =M (;  ()) :
By construction it also holds that
M () = 0 if  = 0:
In this way we can temporarily reduce the parameter space in the identication problem to a one-
dimensional one. The reasoning is analogous to proling in an estimation routine. Particularly we
can ignore any  that does not lie in argmin2M (; ) since necessarily,
M (; ) >M (;  ())  0:
Therefore (0; 0) is identied when M
 () has a unique minimum and min2M (0; ) has a
unique solution.
Theorem 1: (0; 0) is identiable if
M () = 0 if and only if  = 0;
and B (0) has full column rank.
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Proof: Suppose (0; 0) is identiable. If there is 
0 6= 0 such that M
 (0) = 0, then
vaii (0; 0) = v
ai
i (
0;  (0)) for all i; ai by the property of the norm. Since  is closed, by
the projection theorem,  (0) exists and is the unique element in . This leads to a contradiction
since (0; 0) and (
0;  (0)) are observationally equivalent. Next, suppose that B (0) does not
have full column rank. Let 0 be another element in argmin2M (0; ) that di¤ers from 0. Since
M (0; )  0 for all  2  and M (0; 0) = 0, M (0; 
0) = 0. Thus (0; 0) and (0; 
0) are
observationally equivalent, also a contradiction.
Comments on Theorem 1:
(i) High Level Assumptions. Conditions in Theorem 1 are high level as we do not relate them to
the underlying primitives of the model. However, they are statements made on objects that observed
or can be consistently estimated nonparametrically (as other conditions used in all of our theorems
in this paper).
(ii) Feasible Check and Estimation. Since we have reduced the identication problem to a single-
parameter that can reside only in a narrow range, there is no need to refer to complicated results for
the identication of a general nonlinear model. Since it is possible to estimateM () consistently
for all , one can simply plot the sample counterpart ofM over B for an exhaustive analysis of the
problem. Once the minimum ofM is found, the corresponding rank matrix can then be checked.
This is indeed one way to estimate the discount factor, namely by grid search. We can detect an
identication problem if the sample counterpart of M contains a at region at the minimum, or
when the sample counterpart of B (0) does not have full column rank.
4 Identication of the Switching Costs
In this section we consider games with switching costs. Section 4.1 introduces the specic structures
of the payo¤ function and an additional conditional independence assumption. Section 4.2 derives
the closed-form expressions for the switching costs. Throughout this section we do not need M5, but
will continue to assume that M1 - M4 hold.
4.1 Games with Switching Costs
In what follows we distinguish past actions from other state variables. We denote actions from the
previous period by w. So that, with a slight abuse of notation, at time t, there are two types of
observed state variables, (xt; wt), where wt  at 1 and xt is a vector of any other state variables.
Actions from the past of more than one period can also be handled. We provide a discussion on this
at the end of the section.
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Assumptions M1 - M4 are now be updated accordingly by replacing x with (x;w) everywhere. In
addition we need the following assumptions.
Assumption N1 (Decomposition of Profits): For all i; ai; a i; x; w:
i (ai; a i; x; w) = i (ai; a i; x) + i (ai; x; w; i)  i (ai; x; w) ;
for some known function i : A X  A
I ! f0; 1g such that for any ai, i (ai; x; w; i) = 0 for all
x when w 2 W 0i (ai; x), where W
d
i
(ai; x) 

w 2 AI : i (ai; x; w) = d
	
for d = 0; 1.
Assumption N2 (Conditional Independence II): The distribution of xt+1 conditional on
at and xt is independent of wt.
The components of the decomposition of i can be interpreted as follows. i denotes the switching
cost. i is an indicator function, modeled by the researcher, which takes value 1 if and only if
a switching cost is present. We dene i to be zero whenever i takes value zero. In a model
that contains switching costs, it must be the case that for some ai, W
0
i
(ai; ) will be non-empty
since it contains w 2 AI such that the action of players i coincides with ai. Hence it is possible
to consider distinguishing i from i. Then i is to be interpreted as the residual of the payo¤s
that excludes the switching costs. Assumption N1 also imposes some distinct exclusion restrictions.
Firstly, switching costs of each player are not a¤ected by other players actions in the same period.
However, players past actions and other state variables can have direct e¤ects on switching costs.
Secondly, past actions are excluded from i. Typical components in i that are often modeled to
satisfy the required exclusion restrictions include payo¤ derived from interactions between players
at the stage game, as well as other xed costs such as xed operating costs. Furthermore, this does
not mean that variables from the past cannot a¤ect i since xt can contain lagged actions and other
state variables. N1 is assumed in many applications in the literature.
N2 imposes that knowing actions from the past does not help predict future state variables when
the present action and other observable state variables are known. Note that N2 is not implied by
M2. Therefore when xt contains lagged actions N2 can be weakened to allow for dependence of other
state variables with past actions. In many applications fxtg is assumed to be a strictly exogenous
rst order Markov process. Specically this implies xt+1 is independent of at conditional on xt in
addition to N2. In any case, unlike M2, N2 is a restriction made on the observables so it can be
tested directly from the data.
Both N1 and N2 are quite general and are implicitly assumed in many empirical studies in the
literature. Here we provide some examples of i  i and W
d
i
.
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Example 1 (Entry Cost): Suppose K = 1, then the switching cost at time t is
i (ait; xt; wt; i)  i(ait; xt; wt) = ECi (xt; a it 1)  ait (1  ait 1) :
So for all x, W 1i (1; x) =

w = (0; a i) : a i 2 A
I 1
	
and W 0i (1; x) =

w = (1; a i) : a i 2 A
I 1
	
,
and W di (0; x) = ?.
Example 2 (Scrap Value): Suppose K = 1, then the switching cost at time t is
i (ait; xt; wt; i)  i(ait; xt; wt) = SVi (xt; a it 1)  (1  ait) ait 1:
So for all x,W di (1; x) = ? and,W
1
i
(0; x) =

w = (1; a i) : a i 2 A
I 1
	
andW 0i (0; x) =

w = (0; a i) : a i 2
Example 3 (General Switching Costs): Suppose K  1, then the switching cost at time
t is
i (ait; xt; wt; i)  i(ait; xt; wt) =
X
a0i;a
00
i 2A
SCi (a
0
i; a
00
i ; xt; a it 1)  1 [ait = a
0
i; ait 1 = a
00
i ; a
0
i 6= a
00
i ] :
Here SCi (a
0
i; a
00
i ; xt; a it 1) denotes a cost player i incurs from switching from action ait 1 = a
00
i to
ait = a
0
i, at the state (xt; a it 1). So for all x and a i, using just the denition of a switching cost
we can set SCi (a
0
i; a
0
i; x; a i) = 0 for all a
0
i. Therefore without any further restrictions: W
1
i
(ai; x) =
w = (a0i; a i) : a
0
i 2 An faig ; a i 2 A
I 1
	
and W 0i (ai; x) =

w = (ai; a i) : a i 2 A
I 1
	
for all x.
Note that Examples 1 and 2 are just special cases of Example 3 when K = 1, with an additional
normalization of zero scrap value and entry cost respectively.
Before giving the formal results we briey provide an intuition as to why N1 and N2 are helpful
for identifying the switching costs.
Exclusion and Independence
The essence of our identication strategy is most transparent in a single agent decision problem
under a two-period framework. For the moment suppose I = 1. Omitting the i subscript, the
expected payo¤ for choosing action a > 0 under M1 to M4 is, cf. (8),
v (a; x; w) =  (a; x; w) + E [ (at+1; xt+1; wt+1) jat = a; xt = x;wt = w] :
N1 imposes separability and exclusion restrictions of the following type:
 (a; x; w) =  (a; x) +  (a; x; w; )  (a; x; w);
where  is a known indicator such that  (a; x; w; ) = 0 whenever a 6= w. Therefore the con-
tribution from past action can be separated from the present one within a single time period.
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The direct e¤ect of past action is also excluded from the future expected payo¤ under N2, as
E [ (at+1; xt+1; wt+1) jat; xt; wt] simplies to E [ (at+1; xt+1; wt+1) jat; xt]. Therefore we can write
v (a; x; w) =  (a; x) +  (a; x; w; )   (a; x; w) ;
where  (a; x) is a nuisance function that equals to  (a; x) + E [ (at+1; xt+1; wt+1) jat = a; xt = x].
Any variation in v (a; x; w) induced by changes in w while holding (a; x) xed can be traced only to
changes in  (a; x; w). Since  is a free parameter, the switching costs can then be identied up to a
location normalization by di¤erencing over the support of w; e.g. through (v (a; x; w)  v (0; x; w)) 
(v (a; x; w0)  v (0; x; w0)) for some reference point w0.
This simple argument can be generalized to identify switching costs in dynamic games. However,
the way to di¤erence out the nuisance function necessarily becomes more complicated. Particularly
the nuisance function will then also vary for di¤erent past action prole since we have to integrate
out other players actions using the equilibrium beliefs that depends on past actions. Relatedly
there are also larger degree of freedoms to be dealt with as the nuisance function contains more
arguments. The precise form of di¤erencing required can be formalized by a projection that enables
the identication of the switching costs up to some normalizations.12
4.2 Closed-Form Identication
We begin by introducing some additional notations and representation lemmas. For any x;w, we
denote the ex-ante expected payo¤s by mi (x;w) = E [Vi (xt; wt; "it) jxt = x;wt = w], where Vi is the
value function dened in (1) that can also be dened recursively through
mi (x;w) = E [i (at; xt; wt) jxt = x;wt = w] + E[
X
a0i2A
"it (a
0
i)  1 [ait = a
0
i] jxt = x;wt = w] (7)
+E [mi (xt+1; wt+1) jxt = x;wt = w] ;
12Mathematically, for xed a; x, our identication problem under N1 and N2 in a single agent case is equivalent to
identifying g2 that satises the relation:
g1 (w) = c+ g2 (w) ;
for a known function g1 and an unknown constant c. In the case of a game, the relation generalizes to
g1 (w) =
Z
c (x)h (dxjw) + g2 (w) ;
where the unknown constant is replaced by a linear transform (an expectation) of an unknown function.
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and the choice specic expected payo¤s for choosing action ai prior to adding the period unobserved
state variable is
vi (ai; x; w) = E [i (ait; a it; xt; wt) jait = ai; xt = x;wt = w] (8)
+E [mi (xt+1; wt+1) jait = ai; xt = x;wt = w] :
Bothmi and vi are familiar quantities in this literature. Under Assumption N2, E[mi (xt+1; wt+1) jait; xt; wt]
can be simplied further to E[emi (ait; a it; xt) jait; xt; wt], where for all i; ai; a i; x, using the law of
iterated expectation, emi (ai; a i; x)  E [mi (xt+1; ait; a it) jait = ai; a it = a i; xt = x]. Then, for
ai > 0, let vi (ai; x; w)  vi (ai; x; w)   vi (0; x; w) ; i (ai; a i; x)  i (ai; a i; x)   i (0; a i; x),
and emi (ai; a i; x)  emi (ai; a i; x)   emi (0; a i; x) for all i; a i; x. Furthermore, since the action
space is nite, the conditions imposed on i  i by N1 ensures for each ai > 0 we can always write
the di¤erences of switching costs as
i (ai; x; w; i)  i (ai; x; w)  i (0; x; w; i)  i (0; x; w) =
X
w02Wi (ai;x)
i;i (ai; x; w
0)  1 [w = w0] ; (9)
where i;i (ai; x; w)  i (ai; x; w; i) i (0; x; w; i) is only dened on the setW

i
(ai; x)  W
1
i
(ai; x)[
W 1i (0; x). To illustrate, we briey return to Examples 1 - 3.
Example 1 (Entry Cost, Cont.): Here the only ai > 0 is ai = 1. Since W
1
i
(0; x) is empty
Wi (1; x) = W
1
i
(1; x), and for any w = (0; a i), i;i (1; x; w) = ECi (x; a i) for all i; a i; x.
Example 2 (Scrap Value, Cont.): Similarly to the above, Wi (1; x) = W
1
i
(0; x), and for
any w = (1; a i), i;i (1; x; w) =  SVi (x; a i) for all i; a i; x.
Example 3 (General Switching Costs, Cont.): For any ai > 0, based on the denition
of a switching cost alone, both W 1i (ai; x) and W
1
i
(0; x) can be non-empty. So for all i; a i; x such
that a0i 6= ai:
i;i (ai; x; w) = SCi (ai; 0; x; a i) when w = (0; a i) , (10)
i;i (ai; x; w) =  SCi (0; ai; x; a i) when w = (ai; a i) ,
i;i (ai; x; w) = SCi (ai; a
0
i; x; a i)  SCi (0; a
0
i; x; a i) when w = (a
0
i; a i) for a
0
i 6= ai or 0:
Note that SCi (a
0
i; a
00
i ; x; a i) can be recovered for any ai 6= a
0
i by taking some linear combination from
i;i (ai; x; a
0
i; a i)
	
ai;a
0
i2AA
.
The following lemmas formalize the intuition at the end of Section 4.1 regarding how assumptions
N1 and N2 allow us to isolate the (present periods) switching costs from other components of the
payo¤s.
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Lemma 3: Under M1 - M4 and N1 - N2, we have for all i; ai > 0 and a i; x; w:
vi (ai; x; w) = E [i (ai; a it; xt) jxt = x;wt = w] +
X
w02Wi (ai;x)
i;i (ai; x; w
0)  1 [w = w0] ; (11)
where
i (ai; a i; x)  i (ai; a i; x) + emi (ai; a i; x) : (12)
Proof: Using the law of iterated expectation, under M3E [Vi (sit+1) jait = ai; xt; wt] = E [mi (xt+1; wt+1) ja
which simplies further, after another application of the law of iterated expectation and N2, to
E [emi (ai; a it; xt) jxt; wt]. The remainder of the proof then follows from the denitions of the terms
dened in the text.
Lemma 3 says that the (di¤erenced) choice specic expected payo¤s can be decomposed into a
sum of the xed prots at time t and a conditional expectation of a nuisance function of i consisting
of composite terms of the primitives. In particular the conditional law for the expectation in (11),
which is that of a it given (xt; wt), is identiable from the data. Since a conditional expectation
operator is a linear operator, and the support of wt is a nite set with (K + 1)
I elements, we can
then represent (11) by a matrix equation.
Lemma 4: Under M1 - M4 and N1 - N2, we have for all i; ai > 0 and x:
vi (ai; x) = Zi (x)i (ai; x) +Qi (ai; x)i;i (ai; x) ; (13)
where vi (ai; x) denotes a (K + 1)
I  dimensional vector of normalized expected discounted pay-
o¤s, fvi (ai; x; w)gw2AI , Zi (xt) is a (K + 1)
I by (K + 1)I 1 matrix of conditional probabilities,
fPr [a it = a ijxt = x;wt = w]g(a i;w)2AI 1AI , i (ai; x) denotes a (K + 1)
I 1 by 1 vector of fi (ai; a i; x)ga 
Qi (ai; x) is a (K + 1)
I by
Wi (ai; x) matrix of ones and zeros, and i;i (ai; x) is a W 1i (ai; x)
by 1 vector of

i;i (ai; x; w)
	
w2Wi (ai;x)
.
Proof: Immediate.
Let  (Z) denote the rank of matrix Z, andMZ denotes a projection matrix whose null space is
the column space of Z. We now state our rst result.
Theorem 2: Under M1 - M4 and N1 - N2, for each i; ai > 0 and x, if (i) Qi (ai; x) has full
column rank; (ii)  (Zi (x)) +  (Qi (ai; x)) = ([Zi (x) : Qi (ai; x)]), then Qi (ai; x)
>
MZi(x)Qi (ai; x)
is non-singular, and
i;i (ai; x) = (Qi (ai; x)
>
MZi(x)Qi (ai; x))
 1Qi (ai; x)
>
MZi(x)vi (ai; x) : (14)
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Proof: The full column rank condition of Qi (ai; x) is a trivial assumption. The no perfect
collinearity condition makes sure there is no redundancy in the modeling of the switching costs.
The rank condition (ii) then ensures MZi(x)Qi (ai; x) preserves the rank of Qi (ai; x). Therefore
Qi (ai; x)
>
MZi(x)Qi (ai; x)must be non-singular. Otherwise the columns ofMZi (x)Qi (ai) is linearly
dependent, and some linear combination of the columns in Qi (ai) must lie in the column space of
Zi (x), thus violating the assumed rank condition. The proof is then completed by projecting the
vectors on both sides of equation (13) byMZi(x)and solve for i;i (ai; x).
In order for condition (ii) in Theorem 2 to hold, it is necessary for researchers to impose
some a priori structures on the switching costs. Before commenting further, it will be informa-
tive to revisit Examples 1 - 3. For notational simplicity we shall assume I = 2, so that wt 2
f(0; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 0) ; (1; 1)g. And since A = f0; 1g in Examples 1 and 2, we shall also drop ai from
vi (ai; x) = fvi (ai; x; w)gw2AI and i (ai; x) = fi (ai; a i; x)ga i2AI 1.
Example 1 (Entry Cost, Cont.): Equation (13) can be written as266664
vi (x; (0; 0))
vi (x; (0; 1))
vi (x; (1; 0))
vi (x; (1; 1))
377775 =
266664
P i (0jx; (0; 0))
P i (0jx; (0; 1))
P i (0jx; (1; 0))
P i (0jx; (1; 1))
P i (1jx; (0; 0))
P i (1jx; (0; 1))
P i (1jx; (1; 0))
P i (1jx; (1; 1))
377775
"
i (0; x)
i (1; x)
#
+
266664
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
377775
"
ECi (x; 0)
ECi (x; 1)
#
;
where P i (a ijx;w)  Pr [a it = a ijxt = x;wt = w]. A simple su¢cient condition that ensures
condition (ii) in Theorem 3 to hold is when the lower half of Zi (x) has full rank, i.e. when
P i (0jx; (1; 0)) 6= P i (0jx; (1; 1)).
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Example 2 (Scrap Value, Cont.): Equation (13) can be written as266664
vi (x; (0; 0))
vi (x; (0; 1))
vi (x; (1; 0))
vi (x; (1; 1))
377775 =
266664
P i (0jx; (0; 0))
P i (0jx; (0; 1))
P i (0jx; (1; 0))
P i (0jx; (1; 1))
P i (1jx; (0; 0))
P i (1jx; (0; 1))
P i (1jx; (1; 0))
P i (1jx; (1; 1))
377775
"
i (0; x)
i (1; x)
#
+
266664
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
377775
"
 SVi (x; 0)
 SVi (x; 1)
#
:
An analogous su¢cient condition that ensures condition (ii) in Theorem 3 to hold in this case is
P i (0jx; (0; 0)) 6= P i (0jx; (0; 1)).
Example 3 (General Switching Costs, Cont.): Suppose K = 2, we consider vi (2; x) =
fvi (2; x; w)gw2AI ,2666666666666666664
vi (2; x; (0; 0))
vi (2; x; (0; 1))
vi (2; x; (0; 2))
vi (2; x; (1; 0))
vi (2; x; (1; 1))
vi (2; x; (1; 2))
vi (2; x; (2; 0))
vi (2; x; (2; 1))
vi (2; x; (2; 2))
3777777777777777775
=
2666666666666666664
P i (0jx; (0; 0)) P i (1jx; (0; 0)) P i (2jx; (0; 0))
P i (0jx; (0; 1)) P i (1jx; (0; 1)) P i (2jx; (0; 1))
P i (0jx; (0; 2)) P i (1jx; (0; 2)) P i (2jx; (0; 2))
P i (0jx; (1; 0)) P i (1jx; (1; 0)) P i (2jx; (1; 0))
P i (0jx; (1; 1)) P i (1jx; (1; 1)) P i (2jx; (1; 1))
P i (0jx; (1; 2)) P i (1jx; (1; 2)) P i (2jx; (1; 2))
P i (0jx; (2; 0)) P i (1jx; (2; 0)) P i (2jx; (2; 0))
P i (0jx; (2; 1)) P i (1jx; (2; 1)) P i (2jx; (2; 1))
P i (0jx; (2; 2)) P i (1jx; (2; 2)) P i (2jx; (2; 2))
3777777777777777775
2664
i (2; 0; x)
i (2; 1; x)
i (2; 2; x)
3775(15)
+
2666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3777777777777777775
2666666666666666664
SCi (2; 0; x; 0)
SCi (2; 0; x; 1)
SCi (2; 0; x; 2)
SCi (2; 1; x; 0)  SCi (0; 1; x; 0)
SCi (2; 1; x; 1)  SCi (0; 1; x; 1)
SCi (2; 1; x; 2)  SCi (0; 1; x; 2)
 SCi (0; 2; x; 0)
 SCi (0; 2; x; 1)
 SCi (0; 2; x; 2)
3777777777777777775
:
Clearly the required rank condition of Theorem 2 cannot hold in this case. If  (Zi (x)) = 3, then
the maximum number of elements in i;i (2; x) that can be identied using Lemma 4 is 6 given that
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we have 9 equations. Therefore we need at least three restrictions. For example by normalizing one
type of switching costs to be zero. More specically suppose SCi (0; ai; x; a i) = 0 for all ai > 0,
then Qi (2; x)i;i (2; x) becomes2666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777777775
266666666664
SCi (2; 0; x; 0)
SCi (2; 0; x; 1)
SCi (2; 0; x; 2)
SCi (2; 1; x; 0)  SCi (0; 1; x; 0)
SCi (2; 1; x; 1)  SCi (0; 1; x; 1)
SCi (2; 1; x; 2)  SCi (0; 1; x; 2)
377777777775
;
and similar to the two previous examples, a su¢cient condition for condition (ii) in Theorem 2
to hold can be given in the form that ensures the lower third of Zi (x) to have full rank, which
is equivalent to the determinant of
0BB@
P i (0jx; (2; 0)) P i (1jx; (2; 0)) P i (2jx; (2; 0))
P i (0jx; (2; 1)) P i (1jx; (2; 1)) P i (2jx; (2; 1))
P i (0jx; (2; 2)) P i (1jx; (2; 2)) P i (2jx; (2; 2))
1CCA is non-
zero. Such normalization is an example of an exclusion restriction. A preferred scenario would
be to use economic or other prior knowledge to assign values so known switching costs can be
removed from the right hand side (RHS) of equation (15). Other restrictions, such as equality
of switch costs so that the costs from switching to and from actions that may be reasonable in
capacity or pricing games can be used instead of a direct normalization. For instance suppose that
SCi (ai; a
0
i; x; a i) = SCi (a
0
i; ai; x; a i) whenever ai 6= a
0
i, then Qi (2; x)i;i (2; x) becomes2666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 1 0 0 0 0 0
0  1 0 0 0 0
0 0  1 0 0 0
3777777777777777775
266666666664
SCi (2; 0; x; 0)
SCi (2; 0; x; 1)
SCi (2; 0; x; 2)
SCi (2; 1; x; 0)  SCi (0; 1; x; 0)
SCi (2; 1; x; 1)  SCi (0; 1; x; 1)
SCi (2; 1; x; 2)  SCi (0; 1; x; 2)
377777777775
;
and we expect the rank condition to generally be satised. Analogous conditions and comments
apply for vi (1; x).
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Comments on Theorem 2:
(i) Pointwise Closed-form Identication. Our result is obtained pointwise for each i; ai > 0 and
x. Therefore the nite support assumption in M4 is not necessary. The closed-form expression in
(14) also suggests that a closed-form estimator for the switching costs can be obtained by simply
replacing the unknown probabilities and expected payo¤s by their sample counterparts. However, the
theoretical and practical aspects of estimating models where the observable state has a continuous
component becomes a semiparametric one and is more di¢cult. See Bajari et al. (2009) and Srisuma
and Linton (2012).
(ii) Underidentication. In order to apply Theorem 2 a necessary order condition must be met.
Firstly,  (Zi (x)) always takes value between 1 and (K + 1)
I 1; the latter is the number of columns
in Zi (x) that equals the cardinality of the action space of all other players other than i. A necessary
order condition based on the number of rows of the matrix equation in equation (13) can be obtained
from:  (Zi (x)) +  (Qi (ai; x))  (K + 1)
I , so that (the number of switching cost parameters one
wish to identify is the cardinality of Wi (ai; x) equals)  (Qi (ai; x))  (K + 1)
I   1. In the least
favorable case, in terms of applying Theorem 2, the previous inequality can be strengthened by
using the maximal rank of Zi (x), which is (K + 1)
I 1. Then  (Qi (ai; x)) is bounded above by
K (K + 1)I 1. The order condition indicates the degree of underidentication if one aims to identify
all switching costs without any other structure beyond the denition of a switching cost.
(iii) Normalization and Other Restrictions. The maximum number of parameters one can write
down in equation (13) using the full generality of the denition of a switching cost is (K + 1)I ;
see (10). Therefore the previous comment suggests that (K + 1)I 1 restrictions will be required
for a positive identication result if no further structure on the switching costs is known. One
solution to this is normalization. Since (K + 1)I 1 equals also the cardinality of AI 1, one convenient
normalization restriction that will su¢ce here is to set values of switching cost associated with a single
action. For instance the assumption that costs of switching to action 0 from any other action is zero
will su¢ce. Note that such assumption is a weaker restriction than a more common normalization of
the outside option for the entire payo¤ function (e.g. Proposition 2 of Magnac and Thesmar (2002)
as well as Assumption 2 of Bajari et al. (2009)). Nevertheless an ad hoc normalization is not an ideal
solution.13 A preferable solution is to appeal industry specic knowledge to approximate certain costs,
or use other prior economic impose additional structure on the switching costs. A natural example
of the latter is the menu cost, or other adjustment costs in pricing games (Slade (1998)). Also
see My´sliwski (2015) who uses the identication strategy proposed in this paper, where he imposes
equality restrictions (cf. Example 3) on costs associated with supermarket discount decisions.
13There are recent studies focusing on the e¤ects on counterfactuals from an incorrect normalization, for example
see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014).
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In practice researchers can impose prior knowledge restrictions directly on i;i. This can be
seen as part of the modeling decision. Next we show restrictions across all choice set can be used
simultaneously.
Assumption N3 (Equality Restrictions): For all i; x, there exists a K (K + 1)I by  ma-
trix eQi (x) with full column rank and a  by 1 vector of functions ei;i (x) so that eQi (x) ei;i (x) rep-
resents a vector of functions that satisfy some equality constraints imposed on fQi (ai; x)i;i (ai; x)gai2A.
The matrix eQi (x) can be constructed from diagfQi (1; x) ; : : : ;Qi (K; x)g, and merging the
columns of the latter matrix, by simply adding columns that satisfy the equality restriction together.
Redundant components of fi;i (ai; x)gai2A are then removed to dene
ei;i (x). The following
lemma gives the matrix representation of the expected payo¤s in this case (cf. Lemma 4).
Lemma 5: Under M1 - M4, N1 - N3, we have for all i; x:
vi (x) = (IK 
 Zi (x))i (x) + eQi (x) ei;i (x) ; (16)
where vi (x) denotes a K (K + 1)
I  dimensional vector of normalized expected discounted pay-
o¤s, fvi (ai; x)gai2Anf0g, Zi (x) is a (K + 1)
I by (K + 1)I 1 matrix of conditional probabilities,
fPr [a it = a ijx;wt = w]g(a i;w)2AI 1AI , IK is an identity matrix of size K, 
 denotes the Kro-
necker product, i (x) denotes a K (K + 1)
I 1 by 1 vector of fi (ai; x)gai2Anf0g,
eQi (x) and ei;i (x)
are described in Assumption N3.
Proof: Immediate.
Using Lemma 5, our next result generalizes Theorem 3 by allowing for the equality restrictions
across all actions.
Theorem 3: Under M1 - M4, N1 - N3, for each i; x, if (i) eQi (x) has full column rank and, (ii)
 (IK 
 Zi (x)) + (eQi (x)) = ([IK 
 Zi (x) : eQi (x)]), then eQ>i (x)MIK
Zi(x) eQi (x) is non-singular,
and ei;i (x) = (eQ>i (x)MIK
Zi(x) eQi (x)) 1 eQ>i (x)MIK
Zi(x)vi (x) :
Proof: Same as the proof of Theorem 2.
Our previous comments on Theorem 2 are also relevant for Theorem 3. However, we caution that
the ability to relax the necessary order condition may not always be su¢cient for identication. In
particular, consider the following special case of Example 3 when K = 1 in the context of an entry
game.
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Example 4 (Entry Game with Entry Cost and Scrap Value): The period payo¤ at
time t is
i (ait; a it; xt; wt) = i (ait; a it; xt) + ECi (xt)  ait (1  ait 1)
+SVi (xt)  (1  ait) ait 1:
I.e. we have imposed the equality restrictions on the entry costs and scrap values for each player
only depend on each her own actions. Then, for all i; x, the content of equation (16) (in Lemma 5) is266664
vi (x; (0; 0))
vi (x; (0; 1))
vi (x; (1; 0))
vi (x; (1; 1))
377775 =
266664
P i (0jx; (0; 0))
P i (0jx; (0; 1))
P i (0jx; (1; 0))
P i (0jx; (1; 1))
P i (1jx; (0; 0))
P i (1jx; (0; 1))
P i (1jx; (1; 0))
P i (1jx; (1; 1))
377775
"
i (0; x)
i (1; x)
#
(17)
+
266664
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
377775
"
ECi (x)
 SVi (x)
#
:
Note that the order condition is now satised. However, condition (ii) in Theorem 3 does not hold
since a vector of ones is contained in both CS (Zi (x)) and CS(Qi (x)). Even if we go further and
assume the entry cost and scrap value have the same magnitude (i.e. ECi (x) =  SVi (x)), the rank
condition will still not be satised. In this case Qi (1; x)i;i (1; x) becomes266664
1
1
1
1
377775  ECi (x) :
Mathematically, the failure to apply our result in the example above can be traced to the fact
that Zi (x) is a stochastic matrix whose rows each sums to one. The inability to identify both entry
cost and scrap value is not specic to our identication strategy. This issue is a familiar one in the
empirical literature. Similar nding can be found for instance in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014,
equation (21)).14 We refer the reader to their work for related results in a simpler setting as well
14Interestingly, although Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) explicitly assume the knowledge of the discount factor
throughout their paper, a careful inspection of their Proposition 2 will also suggest that either the entry cost or scrap
value in their model can be identied independently of the discount factor under some normalization. Our Theorem
3 is a more general version of this particular implication; Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) derive their result for a
single agent model with binary choice and fxtg is assumed to be strictly exogenous. We thank a referee for pointing
this out.
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as a list of references they provide of empirical work that make normalization assumptions on either
one of these switching costs. It is worth noting that the work of Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014)
focuses on the e¤ects normalizations may have on certain counterfactuals, unlike ours, which is only
concerned with identication and estimation of the primitives. Quantifying these e¤ects from a
particular misspecication, whether by assuming an incorrect discount factor or imposing a wrong
normalization on a switching cost, is an important issue but it is beyond the scope of our work.
The above results can be adapted to allow for e¤ects from past actions beyond one period with
little modication. Specically, all results above hold if we re-dene wt to be at & for any nite
&  1, and then replace xt by ext = (xt; at 1; : : : ; at &+1) everywhere. The inclusion of such state
variable does not violate any of our assumptions, particularly assumption N2, and thus still allows
us to dene analogous nuisance function that can be projected away as shown in Theorems 2 and
3. In this case the interpretation of i has to change accordingly and the switching cost parameters
will be characterized according to ext; in such situation we naturally have W di (ai; ex) 6= W di (ai; ex0)
for ex 6= ex0 since the principal interpretation of switching costs generally will depend on at 1.
5 Numerical Illustration
We illustrate the use of our identication strategies and implement the suggested estimators in the
previous sections. Section 5.1 gives results from a Monte Carlo study taken from Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Section 5.2 estimates a discrete investment game using the data from Ryan
(2012).
5.1 Monte Carlo Study
The simulation design is the two-rm dynamic entry game taken from Section 7 in Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In period t each rm i has two possible choices, ait 2 f0; 1g, with ait = 1
denoting entry. The only observed state variables are previous periods actions, wt = (a1t 1; a2t 1).
Using their notation, rm 10s period payo¤s are described as follows:
1; (a1t; a2t; xt) = a1t (1 + 2a2t) + a1t (1  a1t 1)F + (1  a1t) a1t 1W; (18)
where 1; 2; F and W are respectively the monopoly prot, duopoly prot, entry cost and scrap
value. The latter two components are switching costs. Each rm also receives additive private shocks
that are i.i.d. N (0; 1). The game is symmetric and Firms 2 payo¤s are dened analogously. The data
generating parameters are set as: (10; 20; F0;W0) = (1:2; 1:2; 0:2; 0:1) and 0 = 0:9. Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) show there are three distinct equilibria for this game.
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We takeW0 to be known since it cannot be identied jointly with F0, and estimate there remaining
parameters. Since the payo¤ function satises Assumption M5 there are two ways to estimate the
model. One (Method A) is proling out all the payo¤ parameters using the OLS expression and use
grid search to estimate the discount factor. The other (Method B) is to estimate F0 in closed-form
independently rst before proling out the other payo¤ parameters. Both estimators are expected to
be consistent since we know the correct model specication. Otherwise we can perform formal tests
to see if they di¤er; see Section 5.2 below. We provide summary statistics for both methods. We
consider all three equilibria as enumerated in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). We perform
10000 simulations with each sample size, N , of 100; 1000; 10000 and 100000. We report the mean
and standard deviation (in italics) for each estimator, as well as the square root of the aggregated
mean square errors (in bold) for each estimation method.
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Equ N Met 0 F0 10 20 RMSE
1 100 A 0.822 0.267 -0.255 0.283 1.176 0.303 -1.120 0.297 0.589
B 0.823 0.265 -0.299 0.629 1.158 0.391 -1.088 0.508 0.952
1000 A 0.861 0.182 -0.204 0.090 1.210 0.114 -1.191 0.095 0.254
B 0.861 0.181 -0.200 0.148 1.213 0.118 -1.195 0.121 0.292
10000 A 0.899 0.020 -0.201 0.028 1.200 0.030 -1.199 0.030 0.055
B 0.899 0.026 -0.200 0.044 1.200 0.031 -1.200 0.036 0.069
100000 A 0.900 0.000 -0.200 0.009 1.200 0.009 -1.200 0.009 0.016
B 0.900 0.000 -0.200 0.014 1.200 0.009 -1.200 0.011 0.020
2 100 A 0.833 0.248 -0.363 0.415 1.007 0.409 -0.856 0.545 0.940
B 0.834 0.247 -0.206 0.552 1.097 0.455 -0.998 0.658 1.031
1000 A 0.869 0.161 -0.223 0.153 1.187 0.173 -1.137 0.218 0.363
B 0.869 0.159 -0.199 0.150 1.203 0.167 -1.161 0.210 0.350
10000 A 0.900 0.020 -0.203 0.049 1.196 0.042 -1.193 0.065 0.094
B 0.899 0.026 -0.200 0.046 1.198 0.042 -1.196 0.062 0.092
100000 A 0.900 0.000 -0.200 0.015 1.200 0.012 -1.200 0.020 0.028
B 0.900 0.000 -0.200 0.015 1.200 0.011 -1.200 0.019 0.026
3 100 A 0.834 0.247 -0.368 0.422 1.011 0.412 -0.857 0.549 0.947
B 0.832 0.250 -0.211 0.600 1.104 0.480 -1.002 0.710 1.110
1000 A 0.865 0.171 -0.223 0.155 1.192 0.182 -1.136 0.220 0.375
B 0.865 0.171 -0.199 0.160 1.209 0.181 -1.161 0.226 0.376
10000 A 0.900 0.020 -0.204 0.050 1.196 0.042 -1.193 0.065 0.094
B 0.900 0.018 -0.201 0.050 1.197 0.042 -1.196 0.065 0.094
100000 A 0.900 0.000 -0.200 0.015 1.200 0.012 -1.200 0.020 0.028
B 0.900 0.000 -0.200 0.015 1.200 0.012 -1.200 0.020 0.028
Table 1: Summary statistics from estimating 0; F0; 10; 20 using data generated from equilibria 1
to 3 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
Our simulation study shows there is no reason why the discount factor cannot be consistently
estimated along with other payo¤ parameters. It is also interesting to compare the statistical proper-
ties of the estimators obtained using method A and B. We nd that the square root of the aggregated
mean square error for the two estimators to be very similar across all three equilibria in large samples;
28
with method A performing marginally better in equilibria 1 and 3, and method B performing mar-
ginally better in equilibrium 2. With smaller sample size method B seems to do worse than method
A. There also does not seem to be a dominating estimator for F0. Recall that method B requires fewer
assumptions on structure of the model, while method A correctly imposes the remaining parametric
structure of the payo¤ function but also has more parameters to estimate simultaneously. Earlier
versions of our paper show that when 0 is correctly assumed then the OLS estimator of Sanches et
al. (2016) performs better than method B in estimating F0 (using the mean square criterion). We
also nd that the OLS estimator is inconsistent when incorrect guesses of the discount factor are
used.
5.2 Empirical Illustration
We estimate a simplied version of an entry-investment game based on the model studied in Ryan
(2012) using his data. In what follows we provide a brief description of the data, highlight the main
di¤erences between the game we model and estimate with that of Ryan (2012). Then we present and
discuss our estimates of the primitives.
Data
We download Ryans data from the Econometrica webpage.15 There are two sets of data. One
contains aggregate prices and quantities for all the US regional markets from the US Geological
Surveys Mineral Yearbook. The other contains the capacities of plants and plant-level information
that Ryan has collected for the Portland cement industry in the United States from 1980 to 1998.
Data on plants includes the name of the rm that owns the plant, the location of the plant, the
number of kilns in the plant and kiln characteristics. Following Ryan we assume that the plant
capacity equals the sum of the capacity of all kilns in the plant and that di¤erent plants are owned
by di¤erent rms. We observe that plants names and ownerships change frequently. This can be
due to either mergers and acquisitions or to simple changes in the company name. We do not treat
these changes as entry/exit movements. We check each observation in the sample using the kiln
information (fuel type, process type, year of installation and plant location) installed in the plant. If
a plant changes its name but keeps the same kiln characteristics, we assume that the name change
is not associated to any entry/exit movement. This way of preparing the data enables us to match
most of the summary statistics of plant-level data in Table 2 of Ryan. Any discrepancies most likely
can be attributed to the way we treat the change in plants names, which may di¤er to Ryan in a
15https://www.econometricsociety.org/content/supplement-costs-environmental-regulation-concentrated-industry-
0.
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small number of cases.
Dynamic Game
Ryan models a dynamic game played between rms that own cement plants in order to measure
the welfare costs of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) on the US Portland cement
industry. The decision for each rm is rst whether to enter (or remain in) the market or exit, and if
it is active in the market then how much to invest or divest. Firms investment decisions is governed
by its capacity level. The rms prot is determined by variable payo¤s from the competition in the
product market with other rms, as well as switching costs from the entry and investment/divestment
decisions. There are two action variables in Ryans model. One is a binary choice for entry and the
other is a continuous level of investment. Past actions are the only observed endogenous state
variables in the game. The aggregate data that are used to construct variable prots, through a
static Cournot game with capacity constraints between rms, are treated as exogenous.
We consider a discrete game that ts the general model description in Section 2. The main
departure from Ryan (2012) is that we combine the entry decision along with the capacity level
into a single discrete variable. We set the action space to be an ordinal set f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, where 0
represents exit/inactive, and the positive integers are ordered to denote entry/active with di¤erent
capacity levels. The payo¤ for each rm has two additive separable components. One depends on the
observables while the other is an unobserved shock. The observable component can be broken down
to variable and xed prots. We assume the variable prot is determined by the players competing
in a capacity constrained Cournot game. The other consists of the switching costs that captures the
essence of rms entry and investment decisions. Lastly each rm receives unobserved prot shocks
for each action with a standard i.i.d. type-1 extreme value distribution.
Estimation
The period expected payo¤ for each rm as a function of the observables consists of variable
prots, operating costs and switching costs. The variable prot is derived from a capacity constrained
Cournot game constructed from the same demand and cost functions estimated as in Ryans paper.
Operating cost enters the payo¤ function additively and is treated as a dynamic parameter to be
estimated. These two components are non-zero if ait > 0. For the switching costs we normalize the
payo¤ for choosing action 0 to be zero. Therefore there are a total of 25 switching cost parameters
to be estimated.16
16Ryan (2012) models the switching costs di¤erently. The xed operating cost is normalized to be zero. Non-zero
investment and divestment costs are drawn from two distinct independent normal distributions, whose means and
variances are estimated using the methodology in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007).
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The payo¤ function in our empirical model satises AssumptionM5 so we can prole out the payo¤
parameters. We estimate the model using methods A and B as described in Section 5.1. We also test if
the two estimates of the switching costs statistically di¤er. Instead of using nonparametric estimator,
similar to Ryan, we use a multinomial logit to estimate the choice and transition probabilities in the
rst stage. More specically, method A proles out the 26 linear coe¢cients and uses grid search to
estimate the discount factor. Method B rst estimates the 25 switching cost parameters in closed-form
using the closed-form expression in Section 4, treat them as known, before proling and performing
the grid search. We estimate the standard errors, as well as computing the p-value of the Wald
statistics to test if the switching costs estimators from methods A and B di¤er by bootstrapping.
Our bootstrap sample is generated using the multinomial logit choice and transition probabilities
for each player in each market in the same manner as a parametric bootstrap; cf. Kasahara and
Shimotsu (2008) and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007).
Results
We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before and after the implementation
of the 1990 CAAA. We assume the data are generated from di¤erent equilibria over the two time
periods, but the same equilibrium is played in all markets within each time period.17 Table 2 and
3 compiles the results from estimating switching costs using the data from the years 1980 to 1990
and 1991 to 1998 respectively. Tables 4 and 5 give the estimates for the discount factor and xed
operating cost using the data from the corresponding periods. Tables 4 and 5 report analogous
results using the data from the years 1991 to 1998.
The signs and relative magnitudes of the estimated switching costs almost uniformly make sensible
economic sense. E.g., by reading down the columns in Tables 2 and 3, we see that entering at
higher capacity level generally implies higher cost (negative payo¤), and increasing the capacity level
should be costly while divestment can return revenue for rms. This is quite an impressive nding
in particular for method B, which shows that the observed probabilities can generate switching
costs estimates that capture reasonably well a key feature of a complicated structural model. The
switching cost estimates from both methods A and B are similar. The Wald statistics do not nd
the two switching costs estimators to be statistically di¤erent.18 Therefore we do not reject the
capacity constrained Cournot game specication based on comparing the switching costs estimates.
17If the same equilibrium is played across markets then data can be pooled together. Otsu, Pesendorfer and
Takahashi (2015) suggest the data in Ryan (2012) between 1980 and 1990 should not be pooled across markets, while
the data from 1991 to 1998 pass their poolability test.
18Our test statistic takes a standard quardratic form of the di¤erence between the switching costs estimates from
methods A and B. Its asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis (of no di¤erence) is a Chi-squared random
variable with 25 degree of freedoms.
31
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 also show the entry and switching costs increase after the implementation
of 1990 CAAA. Higher entry costs is a key nding in Ryans paper as new entrants face more
stringent regulations than incumbents. Our nding of the increase in switching costs can also be
partly attributed to the new plants using newer (or better maintained) equipment that requires with
more certication and testing than previously. We also nd the discount factor to be around the
range that are usually used (between 0.9 and 0.95) apart from the estimate using method B before
the 1990 CAAA that appears close to the boundary.19 Although our estimates suggest rms face
a lower borrowing rate than in Ryan, we do not reject the hypothesis that  = 0:9 as assumed in
his paper. We also nd a small increase in the xed operating costs after the implemetation of 1990
CAAA, which can account in parts for the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment
for regular emission reporting needed to apply for operating permits. We refer the reader to Section
2 in Ryan for further details of the industry background.
19The innite time expected discounted payo¤s with respect to each action is unbounded with  = 1. However, the
di¤erences between diverge very slowly when we approximate them with a Neumann sum, and the objective function
appears to be well-dened numerically even as  is very close to 1.
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Method A
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -3.300 - 2.265 5.080 7.956 10.770
0.985 - 0.680 0.707 0.766 0.929
ait = 2 -10.502 -5.243 - 5.528 10.609 15.810
0.937 0.719 - 0.887 0.998 1.117
ait = 3 -23.266 -15.439 -7.624 - 7.996 16.050
1.405 1.010 0.683 - 0.923 1.237
ait = 4 -41.023 -30.620 -20.196 -9.808 - 11.648
2.003 1.850 1.430 1.094 - 1.442
ait = 5 -52.879 -50.648 -39.027 -25.756 -11.949 -
2.281 2.585 2.041 1.395 1.537 -
Method B
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -2.776 - 2.540 5.333 8.014 11.696
0.269 - 0.333 0.567 0.967 1.113
ait = 2 -10.483 -5.197 - 5.243 10.466 15.893
0.689 0.365 - 0.368 0.718 1.110
ait = 3 -23.279 -15.427 -7.769 - 7.732 16.134
1.339 0.920 0.474 - 0.640 1.006
ait = 4 -41.422 -31.007 -20.797 -10.416 - 10.852
1.808 1.594 1.078 0.682 - 0.864
ait = 5 -54.378 -52.892 -41.874 -28.792 -16.091 -
1.911 2.232 1.844 1.659 1.835 -
Specication Test
Statistic 14.069
p-value 0.961
Table 2: Results from estimating switching costs using data from the years 1980 to 1990. Standard
errors and p-value are obtained using 500 bootstrap samples (reported in italics).
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Method A
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -6.962 - 4.449 9.881 15.125 20.264
1.530 - 1.514 1.501 1.689 1.634
ait = 2 -17.038 -8.291 - 9.872 18.531 26.722
1.723 1.364 - 1.714 1.860 1.527
ait = 3 -35.489 -23.412 -11.411 - 12.961 24.283
2.444 1.866 1.371 - 1.955 1.614
ait = 4 -51.544 -50.043 -33.220 -16.363 - 16.524
3.061 3.419 3.278 2.825 - 3.561
ait = 5 -64.018 -63.994 -61.481 -48.514 -24.374
4.514 4.524 4.502 3.683 2.056
Method B
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -5.653 - 5.294 10.730 16.264 21.567
0.726 - 0.704 1.109 1.703 1.378
ait = 2 -17.746 -9.278 - 8.774 17.461 25.754
1.379 0.780 - 0.857 1.364 1.218
ait = 3 -36.098 -24.537 -11.950 - 11.862 23.489
2.282 1.767 1.128 - 1.221 1.401
ait = 4 -51.840 -50.425 -33.468 -16.760 - 16.753
2.202 2.649 2.397 1.904 - 2.025
ait = 5 -64.236 -64.355 -61.706 -48.272 -24.093
6.712 6.771 6.713 5.695 3.389
Specication Test
Statistic 13.196
p-value 0.975
Table 3: Results from estimating switching costs using data from the years 1991 to 1998. Standard
errors and p-value are obtained using 500 bootstrap samples (reported in italics).
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Method A
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.956 -1.679
0.084 0.489
Method B
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.999 -1.523
0.075 0.649
Table 4: Results from estimating the discount factor and xed operating cost using data from the
years 1980 to 1990. Standard errors are obtained using 500 bootstrap samples (reported in italics).
Method A
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.938 -2.079
0.162 1.10
Method B
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.946 -1.893
0.160 0.948
Table 5: Results from estimating the discount factor and xed operating cost using data from the
years 1991 to 1998. Standard errors are obtained using 500 bootstrap samples (reported in italics).
6 Conclusion
Studies of identication of dynamic games typically focus on the payo¤ parameters and take other
primitives to be known. The value of the discount factor in empirical work is often assumed rather
than estimated. Therefore the presumption on the value of the discount factor appears to be neces-
sary for identication and estimation of the payo¤ parameters. We show that the analysis of joint
identication and estimation of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters can be very simple when
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the payo¤s have a linear-in-parameter specication. The complete analysis is equivalent to doing
a grid search over the [0; 1] interval. There is some novelty in our approach.20 Our identication
criterion makes full information on the underlying parameter on the empirical model and has impli-
cations for all two-step estimation methods that wish to estimate the discount factor. One can of
course argue that analogous analysis can be performed with other loss functions. However, without
proling, an exhaustive search with other loss functions, e.g. those based on the choice probabilities
(e.g. maximum likelihood, moments or asymptotic least squares) may not be feasible. Especially
when there are many payo¤ parameters, it may not be trivial to locate the global minimizer even
for a single candidate value of the discount factor. We also provide conditions when switching costs
can be identied in closed-form under independently of the discount factor and specication of other
payo¤ components (linear or otherwise). The latter gives a closed-form estimator for the switching
costs that can be used for specication testing, which for example can use to test for the mode of
competition between rms. We illustrate the scope of its applications in a Monte Carlo study and
an empirical game using real data.
Our take away message that one should be able to identify the discount factor in dynamic games
extends beyond discrete choice games. For example, the joint identication and estimation of the
discount factor and payo¤ parameters in games with supermodular payo¤ functions should also be
possible. See Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) and Srisuma (2013) for descriptions of other types of
dynamic games. However, the practical implementation may be an issue since there is no obvious ways
to reduce the parameter space even when the payo¤ functions take a linear-in-parameter structure
as discussed in the previous paragraph.
Throughout the paper we assume the most basic setup of a game with independent private values
under the usual conditional independence, and we anticipate the data to have been generated from a
single equilibrium. Our results can in principle be extended to games with unobserved heterogeneity,
which has been used to accommodate a simple form of multiple equilibria, as long as nonparametric
choice and transition probabilities can be identied (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Kasahara
and Shimotsu (2009), Hu and Shum (2012)). The research on how to perform inference with a more
general data structure is an important area of future research.
20Appendix A provides a more analytical condition for identication. However, it is only su¢cient and the failure
to apply Theorem 4 (below) does not mean the model cannot be identied.
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Appendix A
This appendix we attempt to give a more analytical approach that ensures identication of (0; 0).
We assume the setup in Section 3 (i.e. assume Assumptions M1 to M5). We proceed by setting up
a map that denes the parameter of interest as its xed-point. We rst introduce some additional
notations and a characterization for the observationally equivalence of (0; 0).
For any x = (x1; : : : ; xp)
> 2 Rp and y = (y1; : : : ; yp+1)
> 2 Rp+1, let kxk1 = maxi=1;:::;p jxij and
kyk2 = maxi=1;:::;p jyij + jyp+1j. Then for a class of p + 1 by p real matrices, we denote the matrix
norms induced by
 
kk1 ; kk2

by kk1;2. We comment that these are not standard induced matrix
norms, however they have simple explicit bounds. In particular it is easy to verify that, for any matrix
p+ 1 by p, C = (cij),
kCk1;2  maxi=1;:::;p
pX
j=1
jcijj+
pX
j=1
jcp+1;jj :
We also need the parameter space to be compact. Let  

 2  : maxi=1;:::;p jij  k
	
and B 
0; b

for some positive k and b 2 (0; 1). Next we introduce the following relation to study the
identication of (0; 0).
Lemma 6: Under M1 - M6, (; ) is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) if and only if (; )
satises
caii  D
ai
i ()    Ei () = F
ai
i
 


!
(19)
for all i; ai > 0, where
caii = v
ai
i (0; 0) R
ai
i0 ;
Daii () = H
ai
i (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1;
Ei () = 
2Haii L (IJ   L)
 1 (Ri0 + i) ;
Faii = [R
ai
i1 : H
ai
i (Ri0+i)] :
Proof: Equation (19) is obtained by re-arranging equation (4), after applying the identity
that (IJ   L)
 1 = IJ + L (IJ   L)
 1 and replace vaii (; ) by v
ai
i (0; 0). Therefore, by
construction, (; ) satises (19) if and only if it is observationally equivalent to (0; 0).
The following result provides one condition that is su¢cient for the identication of (0; 0).
Theorem 4: Assume that J  p+1 and M1 - M5 hold. Suppose there exists i; ai such that: (i)
the rank of Faii is p + 1; (ii) there exists a p + 1 by J matrix A0 such that A0F
ai
i is non-singular;
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and (iii) max fg1;g2g < 1, where
g1 = max
2B
(A0Faii ) 1A0Haii  (IJ   L) 1R1i1;2 ;
g2 = max
;02B;2
(A0Faii ) 1A0Haii
 
(IJ   L)
 1 (IJ   
0L)
 1
R1i
+L (IJ   L)
 1 (( + 0) IJ   
0L) (IJ   
0L)
 1
(R0i + i)
!
1;2
:
Then (0; 0) is identiable.
Proof: First dene Qaii : [0; 1]k ! R
p+1 as follows:
Qaii (; ) = (A0F
ai
i )
 1
A0c
ai
i   (A0F
ai
i )
 1
A0D
ai
i ()    (A0F
ai
i )
 1
A0Ei () :
By construction, from (19), it is easy to see that (0; 0) is a xed-point ofQ. Take any (; ) ; (
0; 0) 2
B , then
Qaii (; ) Q
ai
i (
0; 0) =   (A0F
ai
i )
 1
A0 (D
ai
i ()   D
ai
i (
0) 0 + Ei ()  Ei (
0)) ;
where
Daii ()   D
ai
i (
0) 0 = Haii

 (IJ   L)
 1
Ri1   
0 (IJ   
0L)
 1
Ri1
0

= Haii
 
(   0) (IJ   L)
 1 (IJ   
0L)
 1
Ri1
+0 (IJ   
0L)
 1
Ri1 (   
0)
!
;
and
Ei ()  Ei (
0) = Haii L

2 (IJ   L)
 1   02 (IJ   
0L)
 1

(Ri0 + i)
= Haii L

(   0) (IJ   L)
 1 (( + 0) IJ   
0L) (IJ   
0L)
 1

(Ri0 + i) ;
which can be shown by making use of the following identities:
 (IJ   L)
 1   0 (IJ   
0L)
 1
= (   0) (IJ   L)
 1 (IJ   
0L)
 1
;
2 (IJ   L)
 1   02 (IJ   
0L)
 1
= (   0) (IJ   L)
 1 (( + 0) IJ   
0L) (IJ   
0L)
 1
:
It then follows that
jQaii (; ) Q
ai
i (
0; 0)j  g1 k   
0k1 + g2 j   
0j
 max fg1;g2g

 


!
 
 
0
0
!
2
:
I.e. Qaii is a contraction, hence it has a unique xed point. Now suppose (0; 0) is not identiable.
Then there exists some (; ) 6= (0; 0) that is observationally equivalent to (0; 0). By an impli-
cation of Lemma 6 (; ) must also be a xed point of Qaii , which is a contradiction. Thus (0; 0)
is identiable.
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Comments on Theorem 4:
(i) Compact Domain. B cannot include 1 as the expected discounted returns would then be
unbounded. Compactness is useful for showing existence of a xed point. There is also a tradeo¤ in
the choice of b and k in the denitions of B and  respectively. For example, smaller b and k means
smaller max fg1;g2g but this is a restriction on the parameter space.
(ii) Choice of A0. The need to select A0 can be eliminated altogether by removing some rows
in (19) so that we have exactly p + 1 equations. In fact it is not necessary to take equations that
only correspond to the states from a particular player i and ai. Since the parametric structure in
(19) is the same for all states we can select any p+ 1 equations from any i and ai and compute the
corresponding matrix norms for g1 and g2. This gives us di¤erent combinations of equations we can
use, and we only need the analog of max fg1;g2g to be less than 1 for one of them to ensure (0; 0)
is identiable.
We provide some details for the vectors and matrices for Theorem 4 in the context of the game
simulated in the Monte Carlo study in Section 5.1 as an illustration. However, we note that the
conditions for contraction in Theorem 4 are not met in this particular case. In what follows we
use the shorthand notation that pi (w1; w2)  Pr [ait = 1jw1t = w1; w2t = w2]. Note that, from our
denition, in a symmetric equilibrium p1 (w1; w2) 6= p2 (w1; w2) but instead p1 (w1; w2) = p2 (w2; w1)
when w1 6= w2. We need to vectorize these functions.
1 (a1; a2; w1; w2) = 10 (a1; a2; w1; w2) + 11 (a1; a2; w1; w2) ;
10 (a1; a2; w1; w2) = (1  a1)w1W0;
11 (a1; a2; w1; w2) = a110 + a1a220 + a1 (1  w1)F0;
E [1 (at; wt) jwt = w] = p1 (w)10 + p1 (w) p2 (w)20 + p1 (w) (1  w1)F0 + (1  p1 (w))w
E [10 (a1t; a2t; wt) jwt = w; a1t = a1] = (1  a1)w1W0;
E [11 (a1t; a2t; wt) jwt = w; a1t = a1] = a110 + a1p2 (w)20 + a1 (1  w1)F0;
E ["1t (1) a1t + "1t (0) (1  a1t) jwt = w] =  p1 (w) (v (w)) ;
where  () denotes the pdf of a standard normal variable. Ordering the four states in the following
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order f(0; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 0) ; (1; 1)g, we have
vaii (0; 0) =
266664
 1 (p1 (0; 0))
 1 (p1 (0; 1))
 1 (p1 (1; 0))
 1 (p1 (1; 1))
377775 ; 1 =  
266664
p1 (0; 0) (v (0; 0))
p1 (0; 1) (v (0; 1))
p1 (1; 0) (v (1; 0))
p1 (1; 1) (v (1; 1))
377775 ;
R10 = W0 
266664
0
0
1  p1 (1; 0)
1  p1 (1; 1)
377775 ;R11 =
266664
p1 (0; 0)
p1 (0; 1)
p1 (1; 0)
p1 (1; 1)
p1 (0; 0) p2 (0; 0)
p1 (0; 1) p2 (0; 1)
p1 (1; 0) p2 (1; 0)
p1 (1; 1) p2 (1; 1)
p1 (0; 0)
p1 (0; 1)
0
0
377775 ;
R111 = R
1
11  R
0
11; where
R111 =
266664
1
1
1
1
p2 (0; 0)
p2 (0; 1)
p2 (1; 0)
p2 (1; 1)
1
1
0
0
377775 ;R011 =
266664
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
377775 :
and the transition probability matrices are
H11 = H
1
1  H
0
1;
H11 =
266664
0 0 1  p2 (0; 0) p2 (0; 0)
0 0 1  p2 (0; 1) p2 (0; 1)
0 0 1  p2 (1; 0) p2 (1; 0)
0 0 1  p2 (1; 1) p2 (1; 1)
377775 ;H01 =
266664
1  p2 (0; 0) p2 (0; 0) 0 0
1  p2 (0; 1) p2 (0; 1) 0 0
1  p2 (1; 0) p2 (1; 0) 0 0
1  p2 (1; 1) p2 (1; 1) 0 0
377775 ;
L =
266664
(1  p1 (0; 0)) (1  p2 (0; 0)) (1  p1 (0; 0)) p2 (0; 0) p1 (0; 0) (1  p2 (0; 0)) p1 (0; 0) p2 (0; 0)
(1  p1 (0; 1)) (1  p2 (0; 1)) (1  p1 (0; 1)) p2 (0; 1) p1 (0; 1) (1  p2 (0; 1)) p1 (0; 1) p2 (0; 1)
(1  p1 (1; 0)) (1  p2 (1; 0)) (1  p1 (1; 0)) p2 (1; 0) p1 (1; 0) (1  p2 (1; 0)) p1 (1; 0) p2 (1; 0)
(1  p1 (1; 1)) (1  p2 (1; 1)) (1  p1 (1; 1)) p2 (1; 1) p1 (1; 1) (1  p2 (1; 1)) p1 (1; 1) p2 (1; 1)
377775 :
So that caii ;D
ai
i () ;Ei () ;F
ai
i ;g1 and g2 can be readily constructed.
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